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Abstract
Contrary to common belief that Cameroon is a haven of peace in a 
turbulent Central African sub region, this paper demonstrates that the 
absence of war in the country does not imply that it is peaceful. Given 
the linguistic and cultural diversity of the country with its more than 289 
ethnic groups and a colonial legacy of French and English cultures and 
languages, plus remnants of a German sub-stratum, it should be clear 
that there are many potential ingredients for conflicts in Cameroon. The 
politicians seem to have nurtured these cultural and/or linguistic diver-
sities in ways that fuel conflict and can even spark civil war. The tension 
that results from these ethnic and/or linguistic and religious splinters is 
not overt, however, due to the repressive nature of the regime in place. 
However, this tension continues to grow, to the detriment of the coun-
try’s socio-economic development. There is therefore an acute need for 
measures to defuse such cultural conflicts which have the potential of 
sparking future civil strife in the country.
* Dr Molem C. Sama is the Head of the Department of Economics and Management, 




Since the late 1980s, the globalisation phenomenon and the resulting 
political liberalisation seem to have led to an increased obsession with 
ethnicity, ‘autochthony’ and the ‘politics of belonging’ in Africa and 
elsewhere, thereby creating a crisis of identity. So pervasive and dis-
turbing was this issue of exclusion and new forms of identity arising 
from ‘repackaging’, ‘retribalisation’, ‘reconstruction’ and ‘redefinition’ of 
Africans that a special issue of Africa Today (1998) and a plethora of 
writers (e.g. Awasom 2004; Fawole & Ukeje 2005; Fonchingong 2005), 
as well as CODESRIA have focused on it in an attempt to x-ray its 
complexities. Cameroon is a special case study of identity construction 
and activation. Such a situation can be a threat to national integration 
because of Cameroon’s triple German, Gallic and Anglo-Saxon colonial 
legacies and its more than 289 ethnic tribes.
Cameroon was born out of the erstwhile German colony of Kamerun, 
which became a United Nations mandated territory after World War 
I. The colony was splintered to cater for French and British interests 
against the backdrop of the imperialist morass that ensued. The north- 
and south-west regions of the country, known today as Anglophone 
Cameroon, were administered by the British, while the rest of the ter-
ritory known today as Francophone Cameroon was administered by 
the French. These two separately administered regions reunified in 
1961 after a plebiscite to form a two-state federation with two prime 
ministers, a federal legislature and a single president (Ngoh 1999). In 
1972, the population voted in a referendum to adopt a new constitu-
tion setting up a unitary state to replace the federation whose name ipso 
facto changed from Federal Republic of Cameroon to United Republic of 
Cameroon. This event, referred to as ‘the pacific revolution’ was to turn 
the tide in Cameroon’s chequered colonial history (Stark 1980; Konings 
& Nyamnjoh 2003) as it immediately resulted in what can be called a 
complete annexation of English-speaking Cameroon into a unitary state 
dominated by French-speaking Cameroon. A number of factors resulting 
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from the fusion of the two entities generated ethnicisation and a growing 
polarisation of communal identities: First, there were many inequalities 
which engendered disgruntlement. Secondly there was a spectre and 
repression of opposing voices – especially of leaders and supporters of 
a political party, Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), which 
had been founded in 1948. Finally the state had the ability to effectively 
encapsulate the vulnerabilities of regional fracturing that were a result 
of the union. More disturbing, however, is the fact that in present-day 
Cameroon, the ruling elite has adopted a rather naive approach to the 
concept of peace and security – as meaning the absence of internal and 
external armed war or conflict.
Peace and security must be viewed from a broader perspective than 
this narrow one of the absence of internal and external armed war 
or armed conflict (Jinadu 2000:3). It must be viewed from the more 
positive and more embracing perspective of creating an enabling envi-
ronment for self-realisation and for the enjoyment and sustenance of 
self-development and self-actualisation (Jinadu 2000:3). Thus, from 
a human development perspective (UNDP 1994) and from a physical 
conflict perspective, Cameroon is today confronted with a serious secu-
rity crisis. Unfortunately, the ruling elites in Cameroon have responded 
to the security crisis only by adopting mainly repressive and military 
security strategies (Bidima 2001; Gemandze 2003) within a framework 
of national security policies. The emphasis is thus on national security 
rather than on human or personal security. Yet, it could be argued that 
a policy of human security or personal security (Cilliers 2004; Dumas 
2004) is more appropriate for conflict prevention and/or resolution. 
In view of the persistence of internal conflicts, the absence of peace and 
security and the potential for the eruption of large-scale violent internal 
conflicts, there is urgent need for appropriate policies for managing 
cultural diversity and/or diverse socio-political identities in Cameroon. 
Given this background, this study situates the dynamics of the discourse 
on cultural diversity that has become polarised as a result of elite manip-
ulations and the scramble for shrinking state resources. It sheds light 
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on the appropriation of ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences as a 
modality for reproducing elite hegemony on state instrumentality in a 
period of compulsory economic and political reform. 
State (de)construction and hegemonic alliances
The roots of the fragile Cameroonian stability are not self-evident. 
There is hardly another African country with greater diversity in terms 
of ethnic groups, languages and religions. Among the over 200 ethnic 
groups counted by experts, there are various types of Bantus. There are 
semi-Bantus on the Adamawa Plateau (or the Grassfields) in the south-
west, and Fulbes (Peuls) and Kirdis in the north. The peoples of the north 
are predominantly Muslims, while those in the south and the west are 
predominantly Christians, but there are also large numbers of animists. 
Needless to say, Cameroon’s inner and outer boundaries were drawn 
arbitrarily by the colonial masters and they cut across ethnic lines. 
Colonisation added to the diversity because the once German ‘Kamerun’ 
was split into two protectorates under the League of Nations — British 
Cameroon in the west, and French Cameroon in the east. After inde-
pendence, followed by reunification, French and English were adopted as 
official languages of the country. Besides these two officially widely used 
languages (French being significantly more widely used than English), 
there exists Pidgin English (considered by experts to have developed 
in the plantations) which is widely spoken along the coastline, even 
in French-speaking Douala and in almost all the major towns in the 
country. Cameroon’s great ethnic diversity is therefore accompanied by 
a unique linguistic and cultural pattern which is particularly complex in 
politically sensitive areas like Douala and the Grassfields regions.
As if such diversity were not enough, the country was also divided along 
ideological lines at the time of independence. The communist-inspired 
UPC was in violent revolt against the Ahidjo regime, which was backed 
by President De Gaulle of France. President Ahidjo’s first task was to 
build up a strong army and stop a guerrilla war. From the beginning, 
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Ahidjo’s rule was autocratic (Jackson & Rosberg 1982:152-156) and 
quickly developed the three central features of neopatrimonial rule 
described by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:61-68) as presidentialism, 
clientelism and the massive redistribution of state resources.
Under Ahidjo, presidentialism meant the almost total concentration of 
power around one person and one institution, ‘la presidence’ (Prouzet 
1974:151-86; Bayart 1985:141-59). Ahidjo built up a large clientelistic 
network reaching into practically every corner of the country. People 
obtained their jobs, their licenses, contracts or projects through hire and 
were expected to show appropriate gratitude. Loyalty to the president 
was more important than performance on the job, and as a result, the 
private good had priority over the public good. Such patronage implied 
massive distribution of state resources.
Clientelism went hand in hand with the formation of a multi-ethnic 
ruling class that to this day includes representatives from almost all 
parts of the country. Given the great cultural diversity of the country, 
Ahidjo may not have had any other choice as no single group seems 
large enough to monopolise power. Whatever the reason, multi-ethnic 
elite politics has since been a Cameroonian reality (Le Vine 1986:20-52; 
Prouzet 1974:51-58, 85-126).
Interestingly, Ngayap (1983) pointed out that there are two levels of elite 
integration: a ‘macroéquilibré geopolitique’ and a ‘microdosage regional’.1 
At the macro level, the cabinet and especially the ‘ministres d’état’ (senior 
ministers) have at all times been composed of representatives of all major 
regions and ethnic groups. Appointing both speakers of English and 
French to important posts deftly bridges the Francophone-Anglophone 
division. Ahidjo (the former president) and Biya (the current president), 
both Francophones, have often chosen English-speaking prime ministers 
or vice-presidents. ‘Microdosage’ until recently, shows at the provincial 
level, where the more important positions are deliberately assigned to 
1 The first leading to a broadly balanced geopolitical integration, and the second to a 
smaller scale regional integration.
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representatives of all divisions. Furthermore, and in order to promote 
integration, regional provincial offices are often headed by non-locals 
(Ngayap 1983:68-87).
When Ahidjo resigned in 1982, his ethnic agenda was carried on by 
his successor, Paul Biya, who perfected it. It is institutional practice in 
Cameroon that during elections, high state officials and the well-placed 
urban elite leave their offices for their respective villages to garner support 
for the ruling party – the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement 
(CPDM) (Fonchingong 2005). Those whose constituencies perform well 
are sure of securing their posts or gaining better appointments while 
those whose results are dismal subject themselves to the vagaries of the 
ethnic arithmetic, modulated by the wisdom of the Head of State. Monga 
(2000) succinctly refers to this logic of ‘national integration’ as the ‘ethnic 
alchemy’ that has characterised socio-political life in Cameroon since 
Ahidjo’s reign. It is the reason why the composition of the cabinet after 
major elections often leaves Cameroonians keen on analysing its geopo-
litical zoning and ethnic character. While the ethnic balancing has the 
advantage of pacifying a highly complex polity, it also entails the obvious 
disadvantage of waste, mismanagement and economic stagnation (Jurg 
1999). The fault lines have become complex to manage and even the sis-
terly English-speaking provinces – North-West and South-West – have 
been dragged into the politicisation of ethnicity.
Politics of ‘belonging’ and exclusion
Cameroon’s cultural diversity, instead of serving as a melting pot for 
state construction, has been used by unscrupulous politicians to foster 
dividing and ruling. The stalled democratic process under Biya, has led to 
a revival of ethnic sentiments. In their diversity, Cameroonians are trying 
to negotiate a sense of national identity against the backdrop of elite 
machinations and regionalism. Re-echoing the sentiments on cultural 
diversity, Geschiere and Gugler (1998) have examined the phenomenon 
of the ‘eleventh province’. These are the people with complex identities, 
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trapped at the Francophone/Anglophone frontiers and making attempts 
to adopt a new self-identity within the logic of incorporation. Geschiere 
and Nyamnjoh (2000) reiterate the upsurge of autochthony within the 
context of globalisation with underpinnings of notions of us/them 
opposition. Focusing on the tensions within Cameroon, they present 
autochthony and exclusion in relation to national politics. In this vein, 
Yenshu (2003) demonstrates that cultural diversity in Cameroon can be 
attributed to historical events at the local, regional and national levels. 
Ndue (1999) decries governmental ineffectiveness as he argues that it 
has continuously declined as a result of parochialisation of the public 
realm and resource allocation by government and other state institu-
tions which have typically come to follow ethnic or religious lines. His 
concerns match those of Nnoli (1998), who points out that the inten-
sified polarisation of society into sub-national, ethnic, and sub-ethnic 
cultures widely separated in terms of identity and loyalty, encourages 
further hostility rather than cooperation.
As Fonchingong (2005) points out, the euphoria and high expectations 
associated with the advent of multiparty politics in Cameroon in the 
1990s were soon to become a mirage as the stage was returned to politics 
for parochial interests. Awasom (2004) and Jua (2004) underscore that 
ethnic/regional cleavages have crystallised since the institutionalisation 
of ‘autochthonisation’, ‘politics of belonging’, or ‘the son of the soil’ syn-
drome, following the re-introduction of plural democracy in Cameroon 
in 1990 and the use of identities to cultivate system-supporting atti-
tudes. Against the backdrop of state clientelism and patronage politics 
the political landscape has been reduced to a zero-sum game of ‘who is 
in’ and ‘who is out’, thereby opening the floodgates for elites to negotiate 
identities on behalf of purported collectivities (See Fonchingong 2005 
for details).
As the foregoing impinges on the question of national integration, 
Awasom (2004) wonders if the notion of unity is being ridiculed, as pri-
ority is given to belonging to a group first and to the nation second. If 
this is the case, the notion of unity is being jeopardised by ethno-regional 
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jingoism, formed and sustained by the state. The elite are in the frontlines 
fighting for ethno-political supremacy of the various ethnic groups and 
political representations in Cameroon. They play a prominent role in the 
fractionalisation and integration of classes and ethnic groups in national 
politics. As Ake (2000) notes, the only way for elites to secure life and 
property and some freedom is to be in control, or at least, to share in the 
control of state power. The phenomenon of exclusion and monopoly of 
power is commonplace in the state paradigm in Cameroon. Jua (1991) 
stresses that the government’s hand-picked elite or barons serve as trans-
mission belts between the president and the different ethnic groups.
Thus, political sloganeering and the ‘motions of support’ syndrome are 
frameworks under the manipulation of the elite (Fonchingong 2004; 
Mbuagbo & Akoko 2004). In essence, every important ethnic group 
feels represented within the regime and thus able to exercise some influ-
ence on government policy. Loyal followers in the ethno-client network 
are rewarded by appointments and nominations to state offices, state 
resources and rent-seeking opportunities. The extraordinary develop-
ment of political and administrative tribalism is rife. It is a tradition that 
senior officials upon appointment or nomination seek tribal endorse-
ments from their various villages and regions, which seems to confirm 
that ethnicisation and regionalism are inherent in Cameroon’s political 
landscape. This tribal canonisation following high-level appointments 
put the elite in a political vantage point, as they bargain for the group’s 
share of the national cake.
Ethno-political cleavages in Cameroon
According to Le Vine (2004:215), the ethnic factor has been and remains 
critical to Cameroon politics, given the country’s extraordinary ethno-
cultural heterogeneity and a number of important ethnic and cultural 
cleavages operating on both the national and regional political areas. 
He mentioned that ethnic and cultural cleavages in Cameroon include 
the old North-South division based on historical, ethnic and cultural 
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distinctions between the mainly Muslim and Fulani peoples in the 
Northern Savannahs and the predominantly Christianised and non-
Muslim populations in the South Central, South East and Coastal areas 
of the country. In the North, there is the split between the Islamised and 
the so-called Kirdi (pagan) peoples; in the South various permutations 
of identity politics involve the South Western Bamoun and ‘Grassfields’ 
peoples (mainly the Bamilekes); the Centre-South Ewondo-, Bassa-, and 
Beti-speaking peoples and the Coastal Douala (Le Vine 2004:215).
Amundsen (1999:466) offers a more detailed analysis of socio-cultural 
and political cleavages in Cameroon. He asserts that the political cleav-
ages in Cameroon correspond to three distinct socio-political core 
regions; viz, the Northern, Western and South-Central regions.
Firstly, there is the South-Central region and the Beti (Amundsen 
1999:467-468). The South-Central region consists of the Central, South 
and East administrative Provinces. The capital city, Yaounde, is in the 
Central Province. The dominant ethnic groups in the South-Central 
regions are the Beti and Bulu ethnic groups. The Head of State, President 
Biya, hails from this region. According to Amundsen (1999), tendencies 
towards ethnic cleansing of the higher echelons of the central power 
structure, especially in the security and military forces and the central 
administration, further accumulate power in the hands of the Beti ethnic 
group. Extended privileges and multiple key posts are said to be concen-
trated in the hands of Biya’s closest family and among people from his 
village (Amundsen 1999:467). Moreover, various patron-client networks 
and ethnic loyalties have been nurtured over a long period by prominent 
government and party officials establishing close ties between politicians 
and their constituencies, and making dividends of all sorts reach this 
region more easily. All these factors have led, on the one hand, to an 
unquestionable loyalty on the part of most of the rural residents to the 
urban-administrative elite of the region and, on the other, to a certain 
possibility of control for the regime (Amundsen 1999:468). 
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Furthermore, the Beti, both civil servants and coffee or cocoa farmers, 
vote massively for the ruling party and the Biya government (Amundsen 
1999). This situation is partly explained by President Biya’s ethnic pre-
ference for the Betis, which has led to an overwhelming Beti entourage 
around him with its extensive clientelist network in the Beti core-land. 
It is also partly due to the belief of this ethnic group that they entirely 
depend on the state sector for livelihood and so they must do everything 
in their power to make sure that the regime stays in place (Amundsen 
1999: 408). From the perspective of conflict analysis, it is important to 
note that the government (or some clients of centrally placed politi-
cians) has been using threatening propaganda to frighten the Beti masses 
into voting for the ruling party. Local broadcasts from radio stations in 
Yaounde are said to transmit covert political threats and various kinds of 
messages during political campaigns that foster distrust, fear and hatred 
on an ethnic basis in many Beti communities (Amundsen 1999: 408).
Secondly, there is the Western region and the Bamileke cleavage. The 
Western region consists of the three predominantly Bamileke provinces of 
the North-west, the South-west and the West, and in addition the Littoral 
province with different ethnic groups. These three Bamileke provinces 
are highly cultivated highlands with a dense population, making the 
Bamileke the most numerous (more than 20 percent of the population) 
among Cameroon’s some 200 ethnic groups (Amundsen 1999:408-409). 
The Bamileke have the reputation of being among the most enterprising 
peoples of Africa and truly capitalist oriented. It is likely that they possess a 
greater share of the private wealth of the country than would be expected 
in view of their numbers. They have spread all over Cameroon, seeking 
business opportunities in most sectors. Furthermore, they are organised 
in extended family units, giving each other mutual and financial support 
and hence increased opportunity (Amundsen 1999:469).
John Fru Ndi, leader of the most important opposition party in 
Cameroon, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), comes from this region. 
In fact, one of the more promising tendencies in Cameroon is multiple 
efforts of different opposition groups in this region to form a hosting 
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coordination or alliance of opposition forces to contest the power 
monopoly of the Centre-South. It seems that they are able to coalesce 
their cultural, economic and regional interests and thereby to over-
come internal dissensions in the face of the authoritarian central power 
(Amundsen 1999: 470).




Thirdly, we have the North, with the Fulani and the Kirdi cleavage. 
This region consists of the three administrative Northern provinces of 
the Extreme North, the North, and the Adamawa. The region is rather 
densely populated, and is characterised by Muslim domination. The 
Muslim Fulani (or Hausa or Peul) in all respects constitute the leader-
ship of the region (in religion, culture, administration, ownership and 
wealth) (Amundsen 1999:470-471). The Northern provinces are also 
characterised by the presence of a multitude of different and oppressed 
non-Muslim peoples. The word Kirdi, meaning ‘non-believer’ in Arabic, 
has a negative connotation; but is usually employed to designate this non-
Muslim population. Some Kirdi tribes have adopted Christianity as a 
form of protest against Fulani domination, thereby adding a second, reli-
gious, dimension to the extreme social tensions in Northern Cameroon 
(Amundsen 1999: 471-472).
Conflict situations in Cameroon
Since reunification in 1961, inter-community and ethnic conflicts have 
been common in Cameroon. Inter-community or ethnic conflicts (with 
various degrees of intensity) have erupted in almost all of the ten admin-
istration provinces of the country. The ethnic/regional cleavages have 
crystallised since the institutionalisation of ‘autochthonisation’, or ‘politics 
of belonging’. These conflicts are consistent with the drive of ‘belonging’. 
Ihonvbere (1994) argues that in a context where the state is absent, ‘the 
masses turn to ethnic, religious, and philanthropic organisations for hope, 
leadership, self-expression and support’, thus accounting for the bloom in 
associational and ethnic groupings in Cameroon. For example, in the logic 
of South West indigenes, the North West Elite Association (NOWELA) is 
purportedly protecting the interests of North Westerners. The La’kam stand 
for the ideals of the Bamilekes of the West, while the Essigan represent the 
interests of the Betis from the South, East and Centre. The SAWA2 and 
2 SAWA literally means ‘seaside’, ‘coast’ or, as adjective, ‘littoral’ in the Douala Language 
spoken in the Littoral Province of Cameroon. 
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revitalised Ngondo cater for the interests of Bassas and Doualas. Recently, 
some elites of the Grand North joined the race to defend the interests of 
all Northerners (Adamawa, North and Far North Provinces) commonly 
referred to in the Cameroon ethnic/regional register as ‘Nordist’ (See 
Ardener 1967, Yenshu 1998:27, Monga 2000 and Awasom 2004 for further 
details).
These ethnic cleavages represent different geopolitical interests and are 
carved along tribal lines. Such ethnic groups are ‘natural groups with 
ready-made cleavages for man-made conflicts and alliances in a wider 
state system’ (Otite 1990:4). The ineffective control of voices of dissent 
and ethnic sentiments may lead to the institutionalisation of ethnic 
hatred and conflicts. These ethno-regional communities have become 
conduits in regional quests, thirsting for access to state resources. It is 
legitimate to note that such regional associations have resonated sharply 
in the search for inclusion in the polity.
Dominant ethnic groups in government dictate the pace of change. Along 
these lines, the Beti hegemony and confiscation of power in Cameroon 
were supposedly articulated by Cardinal Tumi, Archbishop of Douala, 
in an interview granted to L’Effort Cameroonais. The Beti occupation of 
political space was proven right following a survey of senior adminis-
trators, the military and other top government functionaries. However, 
Cameroonian politicians are exploiting cultural differences by engaging 
in political discourses that couch cross-ethnic economic inequalities and 
social justice in regional terms (Monga 2000). 
In this circumstance, as Fonchingong (2005) notes, we witness the 
sprouting of seemingly withdrawn identities that have the potential 
for agitation and protest engineered by the ‘divide and rule’ system in 
Cameroon as they scramble for scarce state resources. Associational life 
(Ake 2000) is blooming as the legitimacy of the state vanishes and the 




The fact that such ethnic affiliations (Awasom 2004) are fashioned 
along lines of regional consciousness brings to the fore the categori-
sation of non-members as strangers and outsiders. This bifurcation 
syndrome (Fonchingong 2005) has marred relations between the two 
English-speaking provinces that are continually torn apart by the divi-
sive politics of the regime in place. In most towns in the South West 
Province, non-indigenes are tagged as settlers, graffis, and kam-no-gos. 
These stereotypes are used for those from the Grassfields (North-West 
and West) regions of Cameroon.
In the major elections since 1990 (1992, 1997, 2002, 2004 and 2007), non-
indigenes were often reminded of their ‘stranger’ status. Awasom (2004) 
notes that the liberalisation of the political landscape in Cameroon had 
the undesirable and unforeseen consequence of realigning the citizenry 
into supporters of the ruling CPDM on the one hand, and opposition 
forces on the other, and this quickly assumed ethnic postures. Socpa 
(2002) states that the advent of multipartyism in the 1990s brought 
about ethnic tension and violence involving the Bamelike and Beti ethnic 
groups in Yaounde. He however underscores the fact that multipartyism 
is simply a pretext because the main causes of the ethnic conflicts are 
inequalities of access to land, political positions and control of commer-
cial activities (Socpa 2002:76). For instance, in Douala where the main 
opposition party, SDF, won the 5 Urban District Councils, the Doualas, 
under the umbrella of the SAWA movement, organised a protest march 
against the domination of their municipality by ‘strangers’ (Awasom 
2004; Konings & Nyamnjoh 2000; Yenshu 1998).
The Biya regime, which had evolved and consolidated itself in the one-
party context, saw itself threatened by the ‘opposition enemies’ and 
started perceiving Cameroonians as either autochthones or allogenes 
– those who belong (insiders) or those who do not belong (outsiders). 
The increasing currency of slogans about autochthones versus allogenes 
can be seen as marking a new form of ethnicity (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 
2000). The Government did not take the fall of the strategic economic 
city of Douala to the opposition SDF party lightly. It therefore instigated 
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large-scale demonstrations by the autochthonous people of Douala 
under the canopy of their traditional organisation, the SAWA.
Again, the elections in the capital city and Beti heartland, Yaounde, were 
given a special twist (Awasom 2004). In spite of its overwhelming cos-
mopolitan character, the Biya Government treated the elections in this 
city as if it was a Beti rural enclave, allowing no opposition party to win 
any of the Urban Local Authorities. In the Yaounde 5th District Council 
for instance, which is occupied predominantly by Anglophones and 
Bamilekes, SDF scored an absolute majority, winning all the 35 seats. 
But the government annulled the results on the pretext that the ruling 
CPDM party had petitioned against the inclusion of the name of Mani 
Theodore on the SDF list whereas the said Mani Theodore was still a 
member of the CPDM party. The SDF protested and produced Mani 
Theodore’s letter of resignation from the CPDM party but that was to 
no avail.
Similarly, prior to the 2002 twin elections (municipal and legislative), 
the divisional officer overseeing the registration of voters in Buea (pro-
vincial capital of the South-West Province) blatantly told non-indigenes 
who complained of lack of voters cards to go and register in their pro-
vince of origin. This has become a common practice in Cameroon. The 
then Prime Minister of the Republic, Peter Mafany Musonge (who hails 
from the South-West Province), even distinguished his national brethren 
when he told them not to let the ‘graffis’ (those who originated from the 
Western grasslands of Cameroon – North-West and West Provinces) have 
any control in the councils in Bakweri Land (The Post 2002). One cannot 
help wondering aloud about the scope of his administration and if he was 
Prime Minister of Cameroon or of a particular tribe. During the 1997 
local government elections, one-time Governor of the same province, 
Peter Oben Ashu distinguished himself as a propagandist of the politics 
of belonging. The Governor gave firm instructions that non-indigenes 
in Kumba, another town of the South-West Province, should produce 
residence permits before they could vote. The Bamenda graffis, gener-
ally sympathetic to the opposition SDF, became inescapable targets of 
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the Governor’s public campaigns. He presented them as ‘land grabbers’, 
‘ingrates’ and ‘bellicose strangers’ (Awasom 2004: 283). This brings to 
the fore the cross-cutting identity and ethnic question in Cameroon’s 
multiparty democratic dispensation.
The pre- and post-election violence that sanctioned the 1992 presiden-
tial elections showed the cracks in the state apparatus orchestrated along 
ethnic lines. The frequent molestation of Anglophones and Bamilekes, 
especially in the South and East Provinces, and the likewise harassment 
of some Southerners in the North-West Province is instructive of the 
instrumentation of tribalism and regionalism. Many political activists, 
journalists and students, particularly Anglophones and Bamilekes, were 
arrested and tortured. In the 2007 twin election, polling officers who 
found themselves in predominantly ruling party and opposition strong-
holds became victims of ethnic conflicts in their efforts to monitor the 
counting of ballots. Auto-defence networks, thuggery and ethnic militias 
were prevalent features.
After the 2002 elections, three officials of SDF were molested and exiled 
from their native Ekondo-Titi (South-West Province) for spearheading 
the opposition party’s campaigns. This was done by the indigenous 
population, under the influence of the elite (The Post 2002). It is com-
monplace in Cameroon prior to elections for the elite associations, 
regional groups and ethnic cleavages to get together and indicate their 
leanings. Such meetings, organised by a handful of top elites, purport-
edly speak on behalf of their kith and kin. The meetings are usually 
sanctioned by resolutions and ‘motions of support’ transmitted to the 
ruling party and regime in place. Such slogans are given a high coverage 
on the state media (See Fonchingong 2005 for detail). 
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The Anglophone problem
Today Anglophones constitute approximately one-fourth of the 
Cameroonian population. 3 What is known as the ‘Anglophone Problem’ 
in Cameroon, has received (and will probably continue to receive) con-
siderable treatment in the literature (Balencie & de La Grange 1996; 
Gemandze 2002; Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997, 2000, 2003, 2004; Nkoum-
Me-Tseny 1999; Jua 2001, 2004; Mbuagbo 2002). According to Konings 
& Nyamnjoh (1997:207), the root cause of the Anglophone problem may 
be traced back to 1961 when political elites of two territories with dif-
ferent colonial legacies – one French and the other British – agreed on 
the formation of a federal state. Contrary to expectations, this did not 
provide for the equal partnership of both parties, let alone for the pres-
ervation of the cultural heritage and identity of each, but turned out to 
be merely a transitory phase to the total integration of the Anglophone 
region into a strongly centralised, unitary state (Konings & Nyamnjoh 
2004:192-197). The result over time was the creation of an Anglophone 
consciousness: the feeling of being ‘marginalised’, ‘exploited’, and ‘assim-
ilated’ by the Francophone-dominated state, and by the Francophone 
population as a whole (Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997:2001). Konings and 
Nyamnjoh (2004:192-193) have analysed Anglophone grievances from 
three main perspectives – political, economic and cultural.
The resurgence of multipartyism in Africa in the late 1980s, starting with 
Benin Republic, provided Anglophones with an instrument to express 
their grievances. They therefore spearheaded the reintroduction of mul-
tipartyism in Cameroon and this act initially polarised the Cameroon 
polity along Anglophone-Francophone lines and provided an opportu-
nity for both communities to publicly state what they thought about 
each other.
Firstly, from the perspective of the political domain, Anglophones com-
plain of their exclusion from key government and party positions and 
3 They are estimated at about 17,3 million.
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their inferior role in decision-making councils and organs (Konings 
& Nyamnjoh 2004). Secondly, as regards the economic domain, 
Anglophones complain of the dismantling or neglect of their region’s 
infrastructure, the lack of public investment in their region, and the rape 
and drain of their region’s economic resources (Konings & Nyamnjoh 
2004). Thirdly, the Anglophones complain of the continuous attempts 
at ‘Frenchification’, that is, giving pre-eminence to French as the special 
language and to inherited French institutions and bureaucratic prac-
tices in all aspects of state administration and public life, even in the 
Anglophone territory itself (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2004:193).
These grievances have been articulated with various degrees of intensity 
by a number of Anglophone movements. Prominent among these are the 
Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC) and its Youth Wing, the 
Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL). The SCNC was founded in 
April 1993 at the All Anglophone Conference (AAC) in Buea. It strongly 
advocates the restoration of the statehood and independence of the 
Southern Cameroons. In fact, the SCNC defines itself as an irredentist 
movement, representing the mainstream Cameroonians working for the 
restoration of Sovereign independence of the Southern Cameroons.
The Government has adopted a number of strategies in response to 
Anglophone grievances (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003:133-136):
Trivialisation and demonisation of the Anglophone problem  
(Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003:109-111).
Divide and rule (Koning & Nyamnjoh 2003:111-121). 
The establishment of direct and indirect control over the mass  
media (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003:111-121).
Repression (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003:133-136). 
The above authors assert that most of the strategies employed by the 
government to deconstruct Anglophone identity have tended to be 
accompanied by ruthless repression of the Anglophone population and 
Anglophone activities.
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In fact, in spite of the SCNC’s ‘stand’ for ‘The Force of Argument and 
not the Argument of Force’,4 it has so far borne the brunt of Government 
repressive machinery.5 For instance, Amnesty International reports that 
in December 2005, the Appeals Court in Yaounde decided on appeals 
by imprisoned members of SCNC against their 1999 convictions by a 
military tribunal. The prisoners had been sentenced to between eight 
years and life imprisonment after an unfair trial before special courts 
directly controlled by the Ministry of Defence, on charges in connection 
with armed attacks in North-West Province in 1997. The prisoners had 
been denied an appeal for more than five years. Most of them looked sick 
and frail as a result of life-threatening prison conditions and medical 
neglect (Amnesty International 2006). In fact one of the prisoners, Julius 
Ngu Ndi, who had been serving a 20-year prison sentence, died from 
tuberculosis in July 2005. He had reportedly been denied adequate and 
prompt medical treatment for several months and was taken to hospital 
only days before he died (Amnesty International 2006).
Furthermore, peaceful political activities by SCNC members were met 
with arbitrary and unlawful detentions. For instance, on 15 January 2005, 
as many as 40 SCNC activists were detained and Intervention Unit 
Officers in Buea reportedly assaulted the group’s leader, Henry Fossung. 
Ayemba Ette Otun and about 20 other SCNC members were arrested 
while meeting in October and detained for up to two weeks (Amnesty 
International 2006). The Post (2002) reports that Titiahonjo Mathew, a 
teacher by profession and SCNC activist, was arrested in Ndop with several 
other activists, tortured and transferred to Bafoussam Central Prison, 
4 See The Post, No 0803 of 6/10/2006 p.3, ‘SCNC Leaders are not Cowards’. Prince Hitler 
Mbinglo, Northern Zone Chairperson of the SCNC, stressed the ‘SCNC Motto: The 
Force of Argument not the Argument of Force, vowing that no amount of force will 
deter them. See also The Post, No 0713 of 31/10/2005 p.8, ‘SCNC as Passive Resisters’. 
5 See The Eden newspaper, No. 038 of 31/10-07/11/2005, ‘New Mezam SDO told to Fight 
Secessionists’; Le Front, No 121 of 21/09/2006 p.4, ‘1er Octobre: Etat d’urgence dans 
la zone Anglophone’, where it is reported that between 5000 and 7000 troops were 
deployed to pre-empt independence commemoration activities by the SCNC in the 




where he died under undisclosed circumstances.6 In another instance, as 
reported in The Post (2006), five SCNC activists (Henry Nshadze, Edwin 
Limfonyuy, Moses Komban, Thomas Kongso and Joseph Jumran) from 
Bui Division were taken to Bafoussam in September 2002 after being 
detained and severely tortured by Kumbo gendarmerie led by Captain 
Becklen. At the Bafoussam Central Prison, one of them, Nshadze, suf-
fered a severe cough while Limfonyuy and Komban had swollen legs as 
a result of torture.7
From the foregoing analysis, there is no doubt that the Anglophone 
problem, especially as articulated by the SCNC and the response of the 
governing/ruling elite is potentially one of the most explosive conflict 
situations today in Cameroon (Balencie & de La Grange 1996). In fact, 
Freedom House (2006) states that the linguistic distinction in Cameroon 
constitutes the country’s most potent political division.
National culture: towards conflict prevention  
and resolution in Cameroon
There is a considerable body of literature on cultural and ethnic diversity 
in Cameroon. Part of this literature is concerned with the political instru-
mentalisation and/or mobilisation of cultural/ethnic diversity (Konings 
& Nyamnjoh 2000; Socpa 2002; Zognong & Mouiche 2002; Yenshu 
2003). Much of this literature however, does not pay special attention to 
the question of prevention, resolution and/or management of conflicts 
resulting from the instrumentalisation of cultural and/or ethnic diversity. 
Internal conflicts in Cameroon are caused by the ‘underlying’ and ‘proxi-
mate’ ‘causes’ of internal conflict identified by Brown (1997:5). This is 
clear from the socio-cultural and political cleavages as well as the conflict 
6 The Post No 0400 of 26/08/2002, p.2, ‘British High Commissioner Alarmed by Reports 
on Tortured’, and p.3, ‘Courts Orders Retrial of SCNC Case’. 
7 The Post, No 0905 of 10/10/2006, pp 1-2, ‘Troops storm SCNC Conference, arrest 
Nfor Nfor, 40 others’; see also The Herald No 1890 of 23-24 January 2007, pp. 1-2, 
‘Government Offensive seeks to wipe out SCNC’. 
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situations reviewed above. Crucial factors in this regard are ‘underlying’ 
causes, ‘structural factors’, ‘political factors’ as well as ‘cultural/perceptual 
factors’ (Brown 1997:5). Secondly, as regards ‘proximate causes’, internal 
conflicts are ‘elite triggered’, by ‘bad leaders’ (Brown 1997:5), especially 
through the  instrumentalisation of cultural/ethnic diversity.
It could be argued that the ‘underlying causes’ as well as the ‘proxi-
mate causes’ of internal conflicts in Cameroon are both ‘nurtured’ by 
the absence of a nationalist ideology. In this context of cultural and/
or ethnic diversity, the institutionalisation of national culture could be 
most appropriate for conflict management and/or resolution.
A classic statement on national culture is offered by Fanon (1963). He 
defines national culture as: the whole body of efforts made by a people in 
the sphere of thought to describe, justify and praise the action through 
which that people has created itself and keeps itself in existence. A 
national culture in underdeveloped countries should therefore take its 
place at the very heart of the struggle for freedom, which these countries 
are carrying on (Fanon 1963:233). Fanon further asserts that if culture 
is the expression of national consciousness, then national consciousness 
is the most elaborate form of culture. In Africa the problem of national 
consciousness and of national culture takes on a special dimension 
(Fanon 1963:247).
From this perspective, it could be argued that the promotion of national 
culture is compatible with some elements of the integrated theory of 
the politics of nationalism and ethnicity proposed by Kellas (1991). 
The Cameroon government has recognised the importance of national 
culture for national integration and national unity. Article 1(2) of decree 
No 2005/177 of 27 May 2005, establishing the Ministry of Culture, provides 
(inter alia) that the Minister of Culture is responsible for the formulation 
and implementation of government policy as regards cultural develop-
ment, the promotion of culture as well as national integration. 
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More specifically, the decree provides that the Minister of Culture is 
responsible for:
The development and dissemination of national culture: and 
The establishment of strategies and follow-up measures aimed at  
reinforcing national integration.
At the local level, article 22 of Law No 2004/018 of 22 July 2004 governing 
Local Government in Cameroon provides that local authorities shall 
promote culture and national languages. More specifically local authori-
ties shall (inter alia):
Organise cultural festivities and/or events; 
Offer assistance to cultural groups and/or associations; and 
Participate in regional programmes for the promotion of national  
languages.
It is clear from these legal and regulatory provisions that Cameroon has a 
policy on national culture. The problem however is that no serious effort 
has so far been made to ensure the implementation of this policy.
Conclusion
Contrary to official discourse, Cameroon is not an ‘island of peace 
and stability’ in a conflict ridden/war torn Central African sub-region. 
Peace and security must not be equated with the absence of internal and 
external armed war or conflict. The current socio-cultural and political 
cleavages and latent and/or overt conflict situations indicate that the 
Cameroonian polity is highly volatile and inflammable. The probability 
of conflicts escalating to large-scale armed struggle is high. The camp 
forming that exists in the country presently, fuelled by politicians for 
selfish reasons is a premonition for pending full-blown conflicts and 
wars. There is therefore an urgent need for a review of the current policy 
on national culture to ensure its effective/successful implementation.
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